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Philosophy of Perception as a  
Guide to Aesthetics
Bence Nanay
5.1 The Provocative Claim
The aim of this paper is to argue for a provocative claim: that many, maybe even most 
traditional problems in aesthetics are in fact about philosophy of perception and can, 
as a result, be fruitfully addressed with the help of the conceptual apparatus of the 
philosophy of perception. I will spend much of the paper clarifying and qualifying this 
claim, which after all the qualifications may not sound so provocative after all.
I need to clarify the following aspects of this claim:
 (a) What is meant by aesthetics.
 (b) What is meant by philosophy of perception.
 (c) Why should we accept that it is a promising avenue of research to consider prob-
lems in aesthetics to be really about the philosophy of perception.
I will take these in turn. But before we begin, it needs to be emphasized that on the face 
of it, the claim I make does not sound crazy, at least if we consider the etymology of the 
term ‘aesthetics’. The Greek word ‘aesthemi’ means perception and when Alexander 
Baumgarten introduced the concept of ‘aesthetics’ in 1750, what he meant by it was 
precisely the philosophy of perception: the study of sense perception (scientia cogni-
tionis sensitivae). My claim is that, regardless of etymology, this connection can also be 
made today.
It is important that my aim is not to argue that aesthetics should be a subdiscipline of 
philosophy of perception or that any approach that does not consider aesthetics to be 
philosophy of perception is doomed or should be considered inferior. The aim of the 
paper is more modest (and less imperial): it is to convince the reader that many (not 
all) traditional problems in aesthetics can be efficiently addressed in a philosophy of 
perception framework (see also Nanay 2014).
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5.2 Aesthetics versus Philosophy of Art
First important qualification: my claim is about aesthetics and not about the philoso-
phy of art. I do not suggest that it is a promising avenue of research to consider prob-
lems in the philosophy of art to be really about the philosophy of perception—it would 
be difficult to defend this claim. The philosophy of art, like any philosophy of X, asks a 
wide variety of questions about X—about art in this case. Some of these questions are 
metaphysical, some others epistemological, political, or ethical. I will try to say as little 
about the philosophy of art here as possible.
As it has been repeatedly pointed out, aesthetics and the philosophy of art are very 
different disciplines. The most important attempts to draw a line between aesthetics 
and the philosophy of art were fuelled by a certain mistrust of things aesthetic. The 
general line of argument, by Dickie and Carroll, among others (Dickie 1964, 1974; 
Carroll 2000, 2001), is that too much attention has been given to ‘the aesthetic’ in the 
discussion of art. Aesthetic response (or aesthetic experience or aesthetic appreciation, 
whatever any of these concepts may mean) is only one possible response to art (even 
if we can make sense of what these concepts mean). Thus, they conclude, when we 
discuss philosophy of art, we are better off doing so without any necessary reference to 
aesthetics.
I want to use this argument in the opposite way from the way the opponents of aes-
thetics originally intended. As I want to talk about aesthetics, if I want to follow the 
logic of the Dickie- and Carroll-style arguments, I may be better off doing so with no 
necessary reference to art built into the concept of aesthetics. This is already a signifi-
cant step towards the main claim of the paper: we should detach aesthetics from art, 
but do so carefully.
A consequence of this is that we should not build in a necessary reference to art in the 
definition of the aesthetic domain. Nor should we, of course, build in a necessary refer-
ence to the philosophy of perception, if we want to avoid circularity. I use a simple and 
pedestrian route and define the domain of aesthetics as the sum total of topics where 
we use the term ‘aesthetic’. This would involve (but of course not be limited to) debates 
about aesthetic experiences, aesthetic attitude, aesthetic attention, aesthetic judgement, 
aesthetic value, aesthetic properties, aesthetic stance. To be more generous, we should 
also include those debates that are discussed in aesthetics journals and books but that 
are not strictly speaking (or not necessarily) about art. This would include (but, again, 
not be limited to) questions about picture perception and questions about depiction 
in general (as not all pictures are art), questions about our engagement with narratives 
and about narratives in general (not all narratives are art), about fiction and our engage-
ments with them (not all fictions are art), about metaphor, creativity, and so on.
I said that we should detach aesthetics from art, but do so carefully. To demonstrate 
how this could be done, I use an example that I take to be the paradigmatic example 
of a genuine aesthetics question: the old question about what constitutes an aesthetic 
experience.
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Aesthetic experience is neither necessary nor sufficient for the experience of works 
of art. We can experience works of art in a non-aesthetic manner and we can experi-
ence objects other than works of art in an aesthetic manner. If someone attacks me in a 
museum and there is a small Giacometti sculpture within my reach that I could use to 
defend myself, I will presumably not experience this sculpture in an aesthetic manner. 
Yet, it is a work of art. Conversely, we can have aesthetic experience of nature and of 
ordinary objects (see Carroll 1993 and Irvin 2008 respectively).
In short, although our experiences of works of art often are aesthetic experiences 
(maybe even paradigmatic instances of aesthetic experiences), they are not necessarily 
so, nor do aesthetic experiences necessarily concern works of art. I take this to be the 
general consensus on aesthetic experiences—if we were to deny it, and take the relation 
between art and aesthetic experience to be tighter, we would be likely to run into one or 
another historical example of how not to think about aesthetic experiences. I mention 
two such examples. First, the concept of aesthetic experience has been used to define 
art. The idea is that those objects are works of art that are supposed to trigger aesthetic 
experiences or, alternatively, that trigger aesthetic experiences in a suitably informed 
spectator (see Bell 1914 for a classic exposition). With some alternative definitions of 
art (see Dickie 1964 and Levinson 1979) as well as the widespread scepticism about the 
feasibility and desirability of a general definition of art (see, e.g., Lopes 2008), this use 
of the concept of aesthetic experience seems outdated.
Second, the concept of aesthetic experience has also been taken to be the holy grail 
of how we should enjoy (great) art: if we enjoy (great) art the right way, we experience 
the work of art in an aesthetic manner. What seems to follow from this is that if we do 
not have an aesthetic experience when looking at (great) works of art, we are not doing 
what we are supposed to be doing: maybe we lack aesthetic sensibility or concentration 
or training. A more plausible way of thinking about aesthetic experiences would be not 
to assume that there is a right way of engaging with art, let alone that the right way is to 
have an aesthetic experience.
This way of (carefully) decoupling questions about art and questions about aesthet-
ics could be generalized to all the other questions about aesthetics. Note that by nar-
rowing the focus of aesthetics and detaching questions about art from it, the surprising 
main claim of the paper is looking distinctively less surprising: the claim is that it is a 
promising avenue of research to consider problems in aesthetics, conceived as being 
distinct from the philosophy of art, to be really about the philosophy of perception. 
The next step is to analyse what is meant by philosophy of perception.
5.3 Philosophy of Perception
The strength of the main claim of this paper clearly depends on how narrowly one 
interprets the domain of the philosophy of perception. And it is not clear where the 
boundaries of the philosophy of perception lie (see Nanay 2010c for some discussion 
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on this). If we conceive of the philosophy of perception as the ensemble of philosophi-
cal questions about perception, then a lot of philosophical questions about perception 
also cover questions about non-perceptual mental processes.
Here are some examples: What is the difference between perception and belief? 
What is the difference between sensation and perception? What is the connection 
between perception and action? What are the similarities and differences between per-
ception and imagination? How does perception justify knowledge? All of these ques-
tions are genuine questions in the philosophy of perception but, together, they seem to 
also cover much of philosophy of mind.
Further, perceptual experience is not to be identified with the sensory stimulation of 
our sense organs. Much more goes into perception: categorization, conceptualization, 
and various top-down influences from non-perceptual processes. It would be unwise 
to ignore these non-sensory aspects of perception when analysing various questions 
about perception. Thus, the domain of the philosophy of perception must also encom-
pass these higher-order components of our perceptual processing.
When I talk about the philosophy of perception, I have this inclusive concept in 
mind—an ensemble of philosophical questions connected to perception. This, of 
course, makes the main claim of the paper look even less radical.
Two important examples of mental processes that play an important role in aesthetics 
and that are part of the central domain of the philosophy of perception as I conceive of it 
are attention and sensory imagination. I take it to be relatively uncontroversial that atten-
tion is a genuinely perceptual phenomenon (see Prinz 2010, Nanay 2010a, Wolfe 2000, and 
Prinzmetal and Landau 2008; see also James 1892/1961 and the rich inattentional blind-
ness literature). But the concept of sensory imagination needs some further discussion. 
Sensory imagination (imagining seeing something) is to be contrasted with propositional 
imagination (imagining that x is F). Propositional imagination is a propositional attitude, 
like beliefs, whereas sensory imagination is by definition ‘sensory’: perception-like.
Some philosophers of perception even refer to sensory imagination as a 
quasi-perceptual process (Prinz 2007; Tye 1996; Carruthers 2005), and rightly so: per-
ception and sensory imagination famously have very similar phenomenology: it feels 
similar to see an apple and to visualize one, as one of the oldest experiments of percep-
tual psychology demonstrates. In the Perky experiments, subjects looking at a white wall 
were asked to visualize objects while keeping their eyes open. Unbeknownst to them, 
barely visible images of the visualized objects were projected on the wall. The surprising 
finding is that the subjects took themselves to be visualizing the objects, when in fact 
they were perceiving them (Perky 1910; Segal 1972; Segal and Nathan 1964). The standard 
interpretation of this experiment is that perceiving and visualizing are phenomenally 
very similar—in fact they are, at least in these circumstances, indistinguishable (but see 
Hopkins’s 2012 criticism and Nanay’s 2012b response). Some have argued that the content 
of sensory imagery is also similar to perceptual content (and this may explain the similar 
phenomenology) (Currie 1995a: 36–7; Currie and Ravenscroft 2002: 27; Noordhof 2002). 
For these reasons, mental imagery and sensory imagination have been considered to be 
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part of the domain of the philosophy of perception. Philosophy of perception is not only 
about perceptual, but also about quasi-perceptual processes.
And the concept of sensory imagination has played an important role in a number of 
different debates in aesthetics. Three examples (there are others concerning our engage-
ments with literary narratives or literature in general): first, a grand contemporary debate 
in aesthetics, and one I will return to in the next section, is about depiction. One distinc-
tive and influential position in this debate is that when we look at pictures, we engage 
with a complex episode of sensory imagination: we imagine our seeing the picture sur-
face to be our seeing the depicted object (Walton 1973, 1990, 2002; Maynard 1994, forth-
coming). Second, it has been argued that our engagement with fiction is an imaginative 
one and our strong emotional investment in fictional works can be explained with the 
help of this imaginative engagement (Walton 1978, 1990, 1997; Gendler and Kovakovich 
2005; Goldman 2006; Neill 1991; but see also the reservations of Matravers 1997).
Third, our identification with characters in a movie or in a play is also often explained 
with the help of sensory imagination: the general idea is that when I  identify with 
Hamlet, I imagine Hamlet from the inside (Currie 1995b: 153; Walton 1990: 255, 344; 
Wollheim 1974: 187, 1987: 103, 129; Smith 1995, 1997; but see the reservations of Carroll 
1990: 88–96, 2001: 306–16). Just what this ‘imagining from the inside’ consists in is 
not clear: maybe imagining having Hamlet’s experiences (Walton 1990: 344), maybe 
imagining myself in Hamlet’s situation (Gaut 1998, 1999. See also Smith 1759/2002 for 
a historical predecessor of this idea and Nanay 2010b for discussion; on why this not 
obviously sensory episode may nonetheless be an instance of sensory imagination, see 
Williams 1966, Kind 2001, Baron-Cohen 2007, and Byrne 2007; cf. Chalmers 2002).
All of these three claims have been criticized, but what matters from our point of 
view is that they all count as claims within the domain of the philosophy of percep-
tion: they are about the quasi-perceptual process of sensory imagination. If we con-
ceive of the philosophy of perception in the way that I proposed—as encompassing 
questions about attention, sensory imagination, and visual imagery—then the main 
claim of this paper loses quite a bit from its initial radical appearance.
But some will undoubtedly find this use of the concept of the philosophy of percep-
tion too liberal. They can read the title and the main claim of the paper to be about the 
relation between aesthetics and perception-related issues in the philosophy of mind. If 
the reader found the claim that it is a promising avenue of research to consider prob-
lems and debates in aesthetics to be really about philosophy of mind easier to swallow, 
I’d be happy to concede the label. Importantly, all the consequences I draw in sections 
5.5 and 5.6 would still follow from this claim.
5.4 Normative versus Descriptive Claims
After all these clarifications, it is still not clear why should anyone be tempted to accept 
the main claim of this paper:  that it is a promising avenue of research to consider 
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debates and problems in aesthetics to be about the philosophy of perception. What is 
promising about it? And on what basis should we consider it promising? My strategy 
is to argue that:
  (i) some of the most productive and relevant debates in aesthetics have been, and 
are, about the philosophy of perception and the ones that are not particularly 
productive or relevant are not, and
 (ii) the success of this research direction in the present and recent past gives us 
some (not overwhelming) reason to follow this research direction in the future.
Let’s start with (ii). To take a Lakatosian line, we can talk about progressive and degen-
erative scientific research programmes (Lakatos 1970, 1974). A scientific research pro-
gramme is a temporal sequence of a set of scientific theories. A progressive research 
programme does not contradict any new data and makes new predictions and new 
explanations. A degenerative one sometimes does contradict new data and makes no 
(or hardly any) new predictions and new explanations. If a degenerative research pro-
gramme contradicts new data, this does not falsify the research programme: there are 
many ways of modifying the research programme in such a way that the contradiction 
disappears. These modifications, however, involve adding to the ‘core’ of the research 
programme extra, ad hoc, assumptions that serve only one purpose: to explain away 
the contradiction. These extra assumptions constitute the ‘protective belt’ of a degen-
erative research programme. The thicker the protective belt, the more likely it is that 
a research programme is degenerative. The more new predictions and explanations a 
research programme provides, the more likely it is that it is progressive (Nanay 2010e, 
2011c). Lakatos argues that it is often worth being loyal to a degenerative research pro-
gramme for some time (as it may manage to recover), though if there is an alternative, 
progressive research programme on the horizon, the rational thing to do is to jump 
ship and join the progressive one.
A similar distinction can be made between progressive and degenerative philosoph-
ical research programmes, including philosophical research programmes in aesthet-
ics. A philosophical research programme is, like a scientific research programme, not 
a theory, but a temporal sequence of theories that share some important core assump-
tions. Physicalism or utilitarianism are possible examples for philosophical research 
programmes. A  progressive philosophical research programme would be able to 
explain and predict new data—in this case, not necessarily empirical data. If a philo-
sophical research programme can, for example, be applied successfully to a new, so far 
unconsidered subfield, or if it can explain a new, so far unconsidered phenomenon, it 
is likely that it is progressive. If it faces numerous objections that it can avert only by 
postulating ad hoc assumptions, the sole purpose of which is to explain away these 
objections, then it is likely to be a degenerating philosophical research programme.
My claim is that many, or even most, progressive research programmes in recent 
research in aesthetics have been relying heavily on the philosophy of perception and 
using its methodological and conceptual apparatus. Thus, the rational strategy for 
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the future is to consider joining this research programme. If I manage to establish 
the descriptive claim about the past and present of the state of aesthetics (my claim 
(i) above), we can use these Lakatosian considerations to establish that it is a promising 
avenue of research to consider problems and debates in aesthetics to be really about the 
philosophy of perception.
But is it true that many, or even most, recent progressive research programmes in 
aesthetics have been relying heavily on the philosophy of perception and using its 
methodological and conceptual apparatus? Is (i) true? It is important that the claim 
I made is that many, maybe even most, and some of the most important debates in 
aesthetics have been using the methodological and conceptual apparatus of the phi-
losophy of perception. I do not claim that all of them have.
Let us take the example of the debates about aesthetic experiences again. We have 
seen a very clear candidate for a degenerative research project here, the core of which 
is that aesthetic experiences have something to do with the essence of art. Remember 
the suggestion that we could define art with reference to aesthetic experiences: those 
objects are works of art that are supposed to trigger aesthetic experiences or, alterna-
tively, that trigger aesthetic experiences in a suitably informed spectator (see Bell 1914 
for a classic exposition and Greenberg 1961 for a more recent and much more influen-
tial version of this claim).
The claim that aesthetic experiences have something to do with the essence of art has 
been facing some serious objections and potential counter-examples. There are clear 
examples for works of art that have very little to do with aesthetic experiences. They are 
not supposed to trigger aesthetic experiences, not even (or especially not) in suitably 
informed spectators. Duchamp’s ready-mades or some recent examples of conceptual 
art are often-cited examples. In fact, those who urge the distinction between aesthetics 
and philosophy of art that I elaborated on in section 5.2 are keen to emphasize that aes-
thetic experience is just one of many ways of relating to artworks and a not particularly 
important or relevant one in the contemporary art world.
The philosophical research programme that takes aesthetic experiences to have some-
thing to do with the essence of art is not falsified by these counter-examples. There are 
some extra assumptions that they can and do make in order to account for these apparent 
counter-examples. The main strategy here is to deny that these alleged works of art are in 
fact works of art (or that they are good works of art).1 Greenberg made the most famous 
such gesture when he denounced Duchamp, claiming that his ready-mades are not art, 
but even if they are to be considered art, they are definitely not great art. What role does 
this extra assumption play in the philosophical research programme? The only role it 
plays is to save the research programme from potentially fatal counter-examples. Thus, it 
 1 It would also be possible to counter these objections by broadening the scope of what is meant by aes-
thetic experience (to include the prescribed experience of conceptual art). While we may have independent 
reasons to broaden the scope of what is meant by aesthetic experiences (Shelley 2003), this strategy does not 
seem too promising in the present context: if the concept of aesthetic experience covers conceptual art, the 
worry is that it would need to be so broad that it could not be used to define art (or good art).
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is to be considered part of the increasingly exploited protective belt of this philosophical 
research programme. But a growing protective belt with no new explanations and pre-
dictions is exactly what characterizes a degenerative research programme.
Take the alternative approach to aesthetic experience. There seem to be three kinds 
of theories of aesthetic experience that are very different from one another, but they 
share some basic (‘core’ as Lakatos would say) assumptions that make them all belong 
to the same research programme (remember, a research programme is a temporal 
sequence of a set of various different theories). The most important such core assump-
tion is that the difference between aesthetic and non-aesthetic experiences is some-
thing we can discover if we pay attention to our perceptual processes.
More specifically, these three kinds of theories are the following. First, one can 
define aesthetic experiences in terms of the properties these experiences represent 
(see, for example, Beardsley 1981: 456–70; Carroll 2001: 60. See also Carroll 2000: 207 
and Carroll 2006). Second, one can define aesthetic experiences in terms of the role 
these experiences play in our general mental processing (see, for example, Iseminger 
1981, 2006: 99; Levinson 1996, 2014). And third, one can define aesthetic experience in 
terms of the intrinsic properties of these experiences (see, for example, Stolnitz 1960; 
Bullough 1912; Vivas 1959. The general idea goes back to Kant—see Zangwill 1992 for 
an analysis of the Kantian origins of this concept of aesthetic experience, as well as 
Dickie 1964 and Zemach 1997 for criticism).
All of these three categories consist of a number of importantly different theories, but 
what matters for our purposes is that all of them make an important assumption about 
the nature of the debate, namely, that it is a debate about philosophy of perception.
If the difference between aesthetic and non-aesthetic experiences is a matter of 
which properties these experiences represent, then we need to examine what prop-
erties can and cannot be represented by experiences in general and perceptual expe-
riences in particular. This very question has recently been one of the most intensely 
discussed issues in contemporary philosophy of perception. Beliefs can represent their 
objects as having pretty much any property. Experiences, in contrast, represent their 
object as having a limited set of properties. Some plausible candidates include having 
a certain shape, size, colour, and spatial location. The list may be extended but it will 
not encompass all properties. The property of having been made in 2008 in Malaysia is 
unlikely to be represented in a perceptual experience.
The question then is about which properties are represented in perception and 
which ones are not. A couple of quick examples: it has been argued that we perceive 
objects as trees and tables (Siegel 2006), as being causally efficacious (Siegel 2005, 
2009), as edible, climbable, or Q-able in general (Nanay 2012a, 2013a, 2013b), as agents 
(Scholl and Tremoullet 2000), as having some kind of normative character or value 
(Kelly 2010; Matthen 2010), as having dispositional properties (Nanay 2011b), as hav-
ing moral value (Kriegel 2007) and as affording certain actions (for very different 
versions of this claim, see Gibson 1966, 1979; Bach 1978, esp. p. 368; Jeannerod 1988, 
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1997, 1994, esp. section 5; Jacob and Jeannerod 2003, esp. pp. 202–4, Humphreys and 
Riddoch 2001; Riddoch et al. 1998, esp. p. 678).
In short, the attributed properties account of aesthetic experience heavily relies on 
one of the most contested issues in the philosophy of perception. If what is distinctive 
about aesthetic experiences is the property they represent, then we need to know what 
properties experiences in general can represent (and what properties they cannot). Let 
us take Carroll’s ‘deflationary’ account as an example. Carroll argues that ‘If an experi-
ence of an artwork is a matter of [. . .] the detection of its aesthetic and/or expressive 
qualities, then it is an aesthetic experience’ (Carroll 2001: 60). Given that at least some 
of the ‘aesthetic and/or expressive’ properties seem to be dispositional properties, this 
claim is intertwined with the debate in the philosophy of perception literature about 
whether perceptual experiences can represent dispositional properties (see Nanay 
2011b for a summary).
The second set of theories defines aesthetic experience in terms of the role this 
experience plays in our mental life. Some of the proponents of this approach 
talk explicitly about perception in this context. Here is Jerrold Levinson’s defini-
tion:  ‘Aesthetic experience is experience involving aesthetic perception of some 
object, grounded in aesthetic attention to the object, and in which there is a positive 
hedonic, affective, or evaluative response to the perception itself and/or the content 
of that perception’ (Levinson 2014: section 5). Although what makes an experience 
aesthetic is the connection between a perceptual episode and a non-perceptual 
mental process, this connection is nonetheless a proper subject for philosophers of 
perception.
The third set of theories looks for intrinsic properties that all and only aesthetic 
experiences have, and the most important candidate is what is referred to as ‘aesthetic 
attention’—attention to an object or some of its features that is at the same time disin-
terested or detached (Vivas 1959: 227; Stolnitz 1960: 33–4). Needless to say, that concept 
of attention is also very much part of the conceptual apparatus of the philosophy of 
perception.
My aim here was not to argue that aesthetic experiences are necessarily perceptual 
or that only perceivable entities can be experienced aesthetically. Large-scale narrative 
structure or mathematical proofs can be experienced aesthetically, but they are not 
perceivable. Although the point has been made that they are represented by virtue of 
mental (often visual) imagery (see esp. Mancosu 2005), the main point here is that an 
account of aesthetic experience needs to be rooted in the philosophy of perception.
It is an interesting and complex question whether aesthetic experiences are neces-
sarily perceptual experiences, but everything I say in this paper is neutral as to whether 
this is the case. What I  am, however, committed to is that the only way to decide 
whether aesthetic experiences are necessarily perceptual experiences is by appealing 
to the philosophy of perception. And, as we have seen, the scope of the philosophy of 
perception is much wider than just the question of what is perceived.
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So much for aesthetic experiences. Let us take the question of depiction as a second 
example. One grand debate in aesthetics is about the nature of depiction: about what 
makes pictures pictures. There are three different approaches to answering this ques-
tion: (a) Pictures and only pictures have certain syntactic properties (Goodman 1968; 
Kulvicki 2006); (b) Pictures and only pictures have certain semantic properties (most 
importantly, resemblance to the depicted scene) (Peacocke 1987; Budd 1992; Abell 
2009); and (c) Pictures and only pictures are the things that trigger a certain perceptual 
(or quasi-perceptual) state in suitable observers, a state that is often labelled ‘seeing-in’ 
(Wollheim 1980, 1987, 1998; Walton 1990, 2002; Hopkins 1998; Lopes 1996, 2005; 
Maynard 1994; Gombrich 1960; Nanay 2004, 2005, 2010d; Matthen 2005; Levinson 
1998; Feagin 1998).
Approach (c)  assumes a philosophy of perception framework, whereas (a)  and 
(b) do not. Although we have no justification for believing that (a) and (b) are degener-
ative, (c) is clearly progressive, where various theories belonging to this research pro-
gramme are being used to explain various new forms of depiction (such as computer 
art; see, e.g., Lopes 2009) or new features of picture perception (such as the question of 
inflection; see Podro 1991, 1998; Lopes 2005; Hopkins 2010; Nanay 2010d).
These are only two examples (aesthetic experience and depiction), but there are 
many more debates in aesthetics where the approach based on the philosophy of 
perception seems to be the least degenerative research programme. Some further 
examples include the paradox of fiction, questions about identification, metaphor 
or creativity. It may be more contentious, but the analysis could also be extended to 
debates about aesthetic properties, which are almost always defined with reference to 
some perceptual capacity or another. Nick Zangwill (2011) points out that it has been 
widely assumed by all parties in the aesthetics properties literature that aesthetic prop-
erties are perceived or perceivable. Zangwill himself disagrees with this assumption 
(see esp. pp. 10–11), but it is important to note that my claim is that the debate about 
aesthetic properties uses the conceptual apparatus of the philosophy of perception and 
this can be true even if it turns out that aesthetic properties are not necessarily perceiv-
able properties (as Zangwill suggests). In fact, Zangwill’s own argument relies on vari-
ous debates about the philosophy of perception (more specifically, about the relation 
between perception and subjectivity).
Aesthetic value is an interesting potential counter-example, because it is sometimes 
considered to be the big question in aesthetics. Here, we need to make a distinction 
between the role the concept of value plays in the philosophy of art and in aesthetics. 
In the philosophy of art, some of the most basic (and oldest) questions about the differ-
ence between good and bad art are indeed very difficult to raise without the concept of 
value, but as we have detached the philosophy of art from aesthetics, one may wonder 
what role the concept of aesthetic value plays in aesthetics. It does play a very impor-
tant role in answering the following question: why do we value aesthetic experiences? 
Why do we pay a lot of money to have them? (see Levinson 1999, for example). But 
it could be argued that this question is really a question about certain properties of 
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certain experiences. Some of our experiences are ‘aesthetic’ (whatever that means) and 
these experiences also seem to be intrinsically valuable. Explaining why experiences 
if they have a certain property (being aesthetic) also have another property (being 
intrinsically valuable) is an explanatory project about certain properties of certain 
experiences—arguably a topic for philosophers of perception.
It is also important to note that my claim was that many, maybe even most tradi-
tional problems in aesthetics have in fact been about the philosophy of perception. 
I do not claim that all questions in aesthetics have been dominated by the philosophy 
of perception. The debate about aesthetic realism, for example, has not. It is worth 
noticing, however, that many of both the realist and the anti-realist arguments rely 
on various considerations from the philosophy of perception, especially with regards 
to the discussion of aesthetic disagreements (starting with Hume’s key and thong 
argument).
A final objection: hasn’t conceptual art demonstrated that the perceptual is not eve-
rything in art? If so, putting so much emphasis on perception (or even quasi-perceptual 
processes) may ignore these recent developments in art history. My answer is that 
conceptual art may or may not have demonstrated this, but that is strictly speaking 
irrelevant for establishing claims about aesthetics. Remember that questions about 
aesthetics and questions about the philosophy of art are to be kept separate. There 
are lots of exciting questions about conceptual art within the domain of the philoso-
phy of art. But it does not follow that it poses new threats to any issue in aesthetics. 
Remember: not all experiences of artworks have anything to do with the domain of 
aesthetics: if I sometimes see the Giacometti sculpture as a weapon, there is not much 
that an aesthetician would need to be worried about. The same is true of our experi-
ence of conceptual art (the philosopher of art, on the other hand, has a lot to worry 
about here).
Now that all qualifications are added to the initial surprising claim, I don’t think that 
it should be particularly controversial. The score is simple. The philosophy of percep-
tion is about experiences. Aesthetics is about some special kinds of experiences: aes-
thetic experiences, the experience we have when looking at pictures, the experience 
we have when we identify with Hamlet, the experience we have when we engage with 
fiction, etc. Thus, it shouldn’t sound surprising that it is a promising avenue of research 
to consider debates and problems about aesthetics to be really about the philosophy of 
perception. Again, some of these may not be perceptual experiences. But, as we have 
seen, the scope of the philosophy of perception is much wider than the question about 
the nature of perceptual experiences.
A final clarification: my claim is not that the domain of aesthetics is the perceptual 
and only the perceptual. The claim is that questions in aesthetics are best tackled with 
the help of the conceptual apparatus of the philosophy of perception. Lots of ques-
tions within the domain of the philosophy of perception are not strictly speaking about 
the perceptual (just one example: perceptual justification). Thus, if, as I argue, it is a 
promising avenue of research to consider problems in aesthetics to be really about the 
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philosophy of perception, it would not commit us to say that aesthetics is about the 
perceptual only.
5.5 Methodological Consequences
At the beginning of this paper, I quoted Baumgarten, who introduced the concept of 
aesthetics as ‘scientia cognitionis sensitivae’: as the science of perception. The reference 
to science here is both useful and misleading. It is misleading because Baumgarten 
himself, writing in 1750, was not at all concerned with the various physiological or 
biological aspects of our perceptual system (see Shusterman 2000, esp. pp. 263–7 for a 
good analysis of this).
But Baumgarten’s reference to science is useful because it reminds us that aesthetics 
was originally intended to be a branch of science. As the concept and methodology of 
science has changed since 1750, the concept and methodology of aesthetics should also 
be updated accordingly. More specifically, there are a lot of empirical findings about 
our perceptual apparatus that could and should be used by aesthetic theories. And 
here the connection between aesthetics and the philosophy of perception may become 
helpful.
In recent years, paying close attention to empirical findings about perception seems 
to be the norm, rather than the exception. What this means is not that the philosophy of 
perception has became theoretical vision science. Rather, the philosophical arguments 
about perception are constrained by, and sometimes supported by, empirical evidence. 
Even in the case of some of the most genuinely philosophical debates, such as the repre-
sentationalism versus relationalism debate (Martin 2004, forthcoming; Campbell 2002; 
Pautz 2010; Siegel 2010; Travis 2004; Brewer 2006, 2011; Crane 2006; Nanay forthcom-
ing a, forthcoming b), many of the arguments use empirical findings as premises.
If many, maybe even most traditional problems in aesthetics are in fact about the 
philosophy of perception and can be fruitfully addressed with the conceptual appa-
ratus of the philosophy of perception, then it is also advisable to use the methodol-
ogy of the philosophy of perception. But, as we have seen, the methodology of the 
philosophy of perception is at least partly empirically informed methodology. In 
other words, it is advisable for theories of aesthetics to take the empirical sciences 
very seriously.
It is important to note that I am not suggesting that we should directly import the 
results of empirical psychology to aesthetics. What I suggest is that aesthetics should 
take some new paradigms of the philosophy of perception seriously, ones that are based 
on a large body of empirical research. However, my aim is not to urge an empirical turn 
in aesthetics, but to urge a turn in aesthetics towards the philosophy of perception, and 
this sometimes entails a turn towards empirically informed philosophy of perception.
Take the question of depiction again. There is a huge body of empirical research 
on picture perception and any philosophical account on ‘seeing-in’ needs to be able 
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to engage with this. Just two examples. There is a lot of research on how our picture 
perception is influenced when we look at a picture from an oblique angle. It is an odd 
but important phenomenon that if our position changes in front of the picture, our 
view of the depicted object does not change (Vishwanath et al. 2005; Pirenne 1970; 
Polanyi 1970; Wollheim 1980: 215–16; Matthen 2005: 315–17). Even if we look at a pic-
ture from an oblique angle, we don’t see it as distorted. This is surprising and needs 
to be explained, as the projection of the depicted object on our retina is very different 
from the way it is when we look at the picture head-on. Vision scientists have done a lot 
to explain this difference (Hagen et al. 1978; Busey et al. 1990; Cutting 1987; Halloran 
1989; Rogers 1995; Topper 2000; Goldstein 1987; Koenderink et al. 2004), but this very 
phenomenon puts important constraints on philosophical accounts of ‘seeing-in’ (see 
Kulvicki 2006; Nanay 2008, 2011a).
Another set of experiments that is directly relevant for philosophical accounts of 
‘seeing-in’ concerns the picture perception of patients with brain lesion. It turns out 
that patients with lesion in their dorsal stream (visual agnosia patients) are very bad 
at seeing things in pictures: they are almost completely incapable of picture percep-
tion (see Turnbull et al. 2004 and Westwood et al. 2002). And at least some patients 
with lesion in their ventral stream (optic ataxia patients), while capable of perceiving 
pictures (or at least recognizing that they perceive pictures), are very bad at evaluating 
the length of depicted lines or the size of depicted figures (Jeannerod et al. 1994: 370, 
see also Jeannerod 1997: 62). Again, any philosophical account of ‘seeing-in’ needs to 
be consistent with these findings, and, ideally, a philosophical account of ‘seeing-in’ 
would also be able to explain the malfunctioning of our picture perception in the case 
of visual agnosia and optic ataxia.
Here is an account of seeing-in that is consistent with, and explains, these empirical 
results (Nanay 2008, 2011a). I have argued that it is constitutive of picture perception 
that our ventral subsystem attributes properties to the depicted scene, whereas our 
dorsal subsystem attributes properties to the picture surface. This duality elucidates 
Richard Wollheim’s concept of the ‘twofoldness’ of our experience of pictures:  the 
‘visual awareness not only of what is represented but also of the surface qualities of 
the representation’ (Wollheim 1980: 214–15). Note that this genuinely philosophical 
claim about the way to interpret and substantiate Wollheim’s claims about twofoldness 
is both consistent with, and also explains, the empirical findings about picture percep-
tion in visual agnosia and optic ataxia patients. This is a potential example for how the 
interaction between philosophical questions about aesthetics and the empirical sci-
ences would look if we took the philosophy of perception side of aesthetics seriously.
Relying on empirical data has not been the norm in aesthetics (although there are 
exceptions; see Kulvicki 2006; Lopes 2005, 2010; Matthen 2005; Nanay 2008, 2011a; 
Pignocchi 2010, just to mention a few; see also Lopes and Bergeron 2011). But given that 
some branches of the philosophy of perception made significant advances as a result 
of their close connection with the empirical sciences, if aesthetics were to use similar 
methodology, we could expect similar advances in at least some old aesthetic debates.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Fri Jan 31 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199669639.indd   113 1/31/2014   6:56:18 PM
114 Nanay
5.6 Conclusion: Implications with Regard to 
the Place of Aesthetics among the Philosophical 
Disciplines
Philosophy has been traditionally divided up into two subfields, which are often 
labelled ‘metaphysics and epistemology, broadly construed’ and ‘value theory’. The for-
mer includes, besides metaphysics and epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy 
of perception, philosophy of language, logic, and often even philosophy of science and 
of religion. The latter includes ethics, social and political philosophy, and aesthetics.
I never really understood why aesthetics is placed in the ‘value theory’ bag—there 
are, of course, questions about aesthetic value, but they are either metaphysical—real-
ism versus anti-realism about aesthetic value—or broadly epistemological—how we 
can judge whether an object has aesthetic value. Some may argue that questions about 
aesthetic value mirror questions about moral value in ethics, but one may counter this 
argument by pointing out that the questions about aesthetic value that do mirror ques-
tions about moral value are the ones in metaethics, which, arguably, falls squarely in 
the ‘metaphysics and epistemology, broadly construed’ bag.
If the argument I presented here is correct, then we need to do some relabelling. If it is a 
promising avenue of research to consider problems and debates in aesthetics to be really 
about philosophy of perception, and if philosophy of perception is a subfield of ‘metaphys-
ics and epistemology, broadly construed’, then we have no reason to keep aesthetics in the 
‘value theory’ bag. Whether this relabelling would improve or damage the public image 
of aesthetics among other philosophers is a question I would like to leave to the reader . . .
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